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5.1  Introduction 
High and rising rates of inflation in the United States during the 1970s stim- 
ulated economists to examine the effects of  inflation on household and bus- 
iness decisions about household saving and business investment (see, e.g., 
Darby 1975; Feldstein 1976; Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski 1978;  Auerbach 
1981; Gordon 1984).  Indeed, a substantial body of research has concluded that 
one of the most important channels through which a change in the anticipated 
rate of price inflation can affect real economic activity is a nominal-based cap- 
ital income tax structure (see Feldstein 1983).' In the United States, for ex- 
ample, nominal interest payments are treated as tax deductions by businesses 
and taxable income by investors, capital gains are taxed without an adjustment 
for inflation, and depreciation is written off on a historical cost basis. While 
these features of  the tax  code have not changed in the past 20  years, other 
features-such  as the corporate income tax rate and depreciation schedules- 
have  changed considerably. In addition to these tax changes, the period has 
experienced a dramatic increase in the flow of capital across national bound- 
aries. While the United States may not face a perfectly elastic supply of foreign 
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1. Other distortions include those in the demand for money (see, e.g.,  Bailey 1956; Feldstein 
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of inflation, see, e.g., Fischer (1981), Feldstein (1997), and Hubbard (1997b. chap. 28). 
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capital, rates of return in U.S. capital markets have become more closely linked 
to foreign returns. 
Most of the existing studies of the effect of anticipated inflation on the effec- 
tive tax on business investment were written during periods of significant-at 
least by U.S. standards-inflation.  In recent papers, Feldstein (1997) and Abel 
(1997), using different methodological approaches, estimate significant welfare 
gains from greater business capital accumulation from reducing even modest 
rates of  inflation.* Indeed, the present value of  gains from reducing inflation 
substantially exceeds the costs of disinflation estimated by Ball (1994). 
In this paper, we extend prior approaches to estimating the impact of domes- 
tic inflation on business investment-based  on subsequent modifications to the 
tax code, the increasing openness of world capital markets, and recent develop- 
ments in the theoretical modeling of  investment decisions. In particular, we 
quantify the impact of an immediate and permanent change in the rate of infla- 
tion on the user cost of capital for different types of assets in a partial equilib- 
rium frame~ork.~  In addition, we show the relationship between the resulting 
inflation sensitivity of the user cost and the choice of  capital durability. We 
also present estimates of the sensitivity of current investment incentives to an- 
ticipated changes in future rates of inflation and explore the effects of inflation 
on steady state consumption. Finally, we  present estimates of the impact of 
inflation on intratemporal distortions in the allocation of capital. 
In brief, we conclude that for the United States (1) inflation, even at its 
relatively low current rates, continues to increase the user cost of capital sig- 
nificantly; (2) the marginal percentage reduction in the user cost of capital per 
percentage point reduction in inflation is higher the lower the level of inflation; 
(3) the beneficial effects of  lowering inflation even further than  has been 
achieved to date would be notable; and (4) inflation has almost no impact on 
intratemporal distortions in the allocation of capital within the domestic busi- 
ness sector. These conclusions support the arguments by Feldstein (1997) that 
there are potentially significant economic benefits for the U.S. economy of 
reducing even modest levels of inflation. However, we also show that there is 
a great deal of uncertainty concerning the relevance of these conclusions for 
small open economies. 
2. In both sets of estimates, the gains from a reduced distortion in the allocation of lifetime 
consumption between early years and later years account for the vast majority of total welfare 
gains from disinflation. 
3. In our analysis of the effects of inflation on the effective tax rate on investment, we assume 
that there is no correlation between changes in capital income tax rates and changes in inflation; 
i.e., we do not allow for the possibility that the legislative process takes into account the effect of 
inflation on the effective tax burden when deciding on individual and corporate tax rates. It might 
be the case, e.g., that the Congress introduces more generous depreciation allowances or  lower 
statutory tax rates on capital gains when inflation is higher. While there is some discussion of this 
connection in the context of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 (see Joint Committee on 
Taxation 1981),  we could find no record of such discussion in the debate over the Tax Reform Act 
of  1986 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  1993 (the tax acts governing the current 
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By focusing on the effects of disinflation on the user cost of capital and the 
capital stock, we are abstracting from two general questions. First, we do not 
present estimates of the welfare gains from the higher capital stock made pos- 
sible by  lower inflati~n.~  Second, we do not attempt to estimate the optimal 
rate of inflation. Such a calculation requires a more comprehensive model of 
the costs and benefits of inflation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 5.2 we ana- 
lyze the theoretical linkages between inflation and the user cost of capital. In 
section 5.3 we present empirical estimates of the effects of an immediate and 
permanent change in the rate of inflation on the user cost for different types of 
capital, taking into account the details of current U.S. corporate tax law. Sec- 
tion 5.4 extends these results by analyzing the impact on the user cost of antici- 
pated future changes in the rate of  inflation. In section 5.5 we examine the 
effects of  lower inflation on steady state consumption. Section 5.6 examines 
the effects of inflation on the welfare losses associated with differential taxa- 
tion of  capital. In the final section, we offer some concluding thoughts and 
directions for future research. 
5.2  Inflation and the User Cost of Capital 
5.2.1  Inflation and the Cost of Funds 
Firms can obtain their financing from three sources: they can issue debt, 
they can issue equity, or they can use internal funds. In this section, we discuss 
the effects of  the interaction of  inflation and tax variables on the marginal 
cost of finance for U.S. firms from these different sources. The effects depend 
importantly on open economy issues, in particular the degree of  openness of 
international capital markets. For simplicity, however, we begin with a discus- 
sion of effects of inflation on the cost of funds in a closed U.S. capital market; 
then we  expand the analysis to incorporate an open capital market and the 
international tax regime. 
Debt Financing 
a fixed real after-tax rate of return, r,5  where 
In a closed economy, U.S. holders of corporate debt are assumed to require 
4.  To  do so would require separating transition gains and losses from steady state efficiency 
gains, which is beyond the scope of this paper. As we argue in section 5.7, however, under the 
assumption that the United States is a closed economy, one can use golden rule calculations to 
argue that the level of the fixed nonresidential capital stock is too low. 
5.  The assumption of a constant real rate of interest represents the traditional Fisher hypothesis 
(see Fisher 1930). The Fisher hypothesis need not hold in the presence of the inflation-tax interac- 
tions that we analyze here. Indeed, if the only nonneutrality of interest were the deductibility and 
taxability of nominal interest payments for debt-financed investments, nominal interest rates would 
rise more than one for one with anticipated inflation (see Feldstein 1976). Offsetting this consider- 
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(1)  r  =  R(1 - Tp) - IT, 
and R is the nominal interest rate on corporate debt, T~ is the marginal personal 
tax rate on interest income, and IT  is the expected rate of inflation. This expres- 
sion for the real return on funds loaned reflects the fact that under current U.S. 
tax law, nominal interest income-which  includes both the real and the infla- 
tion premium components of market interest rates-is  taxable to bondholders. 
For a given r and IT, a reduction in the marginal tax rate of the holder of debt 
lowers the nominal interest rates that firms pay, and for a given r and T~,  a 1 
percentage point reduction in the rate of inflation lowers the interest rates that 
firms pay by  more than  1 percentage point. In  addition to the tax-adjusted 
Fisher effect, we also examine the case in which the real before-tax interest 
rate is held constant, which is especially relevant for a small open economy; 
with this assumption, a  1  percentage point reduction in the rate of  inflation 
raises the real after-tax interest rate, r, by T~ percentage points. 
The firm’s  real cost of  debt, pd, depends on its own marginal income tax 
rate, 7,: 
(2)  pd  =  R(1 - Tc) - IT. 
Expression (2)  reflects the deductibility of nominal interest payments on cor- 
porate debt under current law. Combining equations (1) and (2)  yields the firm’s 
real cost of  debt from the perspective of the ultimate supplier of debt capital 
rather than from that of the firm’s manager: 
Note that for a given real required return r, inflation has very little effect on 
the cost of debt finance if  7,  is approximately equal to T~.  In this case, while 
lower inflation reduces the nominal interest deduction, thereby raising the 
firm’s tax liability, it also lowers the tax liability of bondholders by  about the 
same amount. In addition, the effects of inflation on the cost of  debt finance 
tional capital mobility (see also Hartman 1979; Feldstein 1983;  Hansson and Stuart 1986; Bayoumi 
and Gagnon 1996). Empirical evidence presented by Mishkin (1992) and by Bayoumi and Gagnon 
(1996) argues that the real pretax rate of interest is not affected by a change in expected inflation. 
We investigated these empirical estimates: Using the nominal one-year Treasury bill rate, the 
Livingston measure of expected (one-year-ahead) inflation, and a time series of the effective mar- 
ginal tax rate on interest income of Prakken, Varvares, and Meyer (1991), we find that both the 
nominal before-tax rate and the after-tax rate are cointegrated with the expected inflation measure 
and that both the real before-tax rate and the real after-tax rate are stationary. We view this as 
providing ambiguous evidence of whether the tax-adjusted or non-tax-adjusted Fisher effect holds. 
In any case, the fact that results of Prakken et al. show that taxes are in fact paid on interest income 
at a rate between zero and the maximum statutory rate suggests that the marginal investor may 
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will vanish for a given required real after-tax return if  firms are required to 
deduct only real, rather than nominal, interest payments and if bondholders are 
allowed to include only real interest income in taxable income. Such would be 
the case with a fully indexed tax structure.6  Note also that the effects of infla- 
tion on the cost of  debt finance depend crucially on the assumption that the 
marginal debt holder is taxable at the statutory rate  T~.  If  the marginal debt 
holder is a financial intermediary such as a pension plan (whose income is 
nontaxable under current law), then lower inflation can increase the cost of 
debt finance. Firms receive smaller interest deductions, and pension funds do 
not accrue an offsetting decrease in tax liability. Although convincing evidence 
of the tax rate of the marginal debt holder in the United States probably is not 
available, the observation made above that taxes appear to be paid on interest 
income at a fairly high effective rate lends some support for the proposition 
that the effects of inflation on the user cost through the debt channel will be 
relatively small. 
The results differ somewhat in the case of  integration of the U.S. capital 
market with an open international capital market. In particular, the results de- 
pend on the degree to which the United States exerts market power and on the 
extremely complicated details of  international tax law. At  one extreme, one 
could assume that the United States is so large that it determines all relevant 
market  and tax conditions; this assumption essentially reduces to the prior 
closed economy case. By contrast, if the United States participates as a price 
taker in a world with perfect international capital mobility, the real cost of debt 
is determined in world capital markets and is exogenously given to U.S.  firm^.^ 
Moreover, under a pure residence-based income tax structure, which is likely 
to be the most relevant modeling assumption in the case of international taxes 
on interest income, the interest rate that U.S. corporations must pay on their 
debt obligations may be independent both of domestic and foreign tax rates on 
interest income.* 
With perfectly integrated capital markets (and no transactions or informa- 
tion costs), uncovered or open interest parity holds. That is, for a marginal risk- 
6. With the tax structure indexed for inflation, bondholders’ real after-tax rate of return becomes 
r = (R -  r)(l -  TJ,  while firms’ real cost of debt becomes pd = (R -  r)(1 -  TJ.  Combining 
these two expressions yields pd = r(l -  TJ(~ -  TJ.  which is independent of the rate of inflation 
for a given r. 
7. Hartman argues that when taxes are taken into consideration, domestic inflation in a small 
open economy raises the desired capital stock and reduces domestic saving, thereby increasing 
capital inflows from the rest of the world. Empirical support for this proposition is provided by 
Bayoumi and Gagnon (1996). 
8. A residence-based  tax system can be summarized briefly as follows. If  country A has  a 
residence-based tax system applicable to interest income, the residents of country A are taxed 
uniformly on their worldwide interest income, whether the source of that income is country A or 
the rest of the world; nonresidents are not taxed by country A on their income originating in that 
country. In fact, residence-based taxation of interest income holds approximately in the United 
States and many other countries (for a more complete discussion of international tax law, see 
Hubbard  1995; Hines and Hubbard  1995). Such a tax structure generates a particular form of 
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neutral investor, the nominal after-tax rate of return on U.S. debt instruments 
equals the exogenous after-tax rate of return on a foreign debt instrument plus 
the expected percentage rate of  depreciation of the dollar relative to foreign 
currencies. With residence-based taxation, the applicable tax rate for a U.S. 
investor is the U.S. tax rate, while the applicable tax rate for the foreign inves- 
tor is the foreign tax rate. This implies two separate parity conditions. For the 
U.S. investor we have R(l -  T,,) = R*(l -  TJ + Ase(l -  T,), where se denotes 
the expected log future spot dollar value of foreign exchange, R* denotes the 
exogenous foreign nominal interest rate, and T, represents the U.S. tax rate on 
foreign exchange gains; this condition implies that U.S. investors are indiffer- 
ent between investing at home or abroad. Similarly, for the foreign investor, 
the parity condition is R(1 -  7:)  = R*(1 -  7:)  + As‘(1 -  T:),  where T: 
denotes the foreign tax rate on interest income, and T,* represents the foreign 
tax rate on foreign exchange gains9  If  T~ = T, and T:  =  T,*,  then the interna- 
tional arbitrage relationships imply the equality of  pretax interest rates (ad- 
justed for expected exchange rate changes). In this case, the interest rate that 
U.S. corporations must pay on their debt is not influenced by either the U.S. or 
the foreign tax rate on interest income.’O In a small open economy setting in 
which purchasing power parity holds (which implies that Ase =  IT -  IT*,  where 
IT*  denotes the foreign inflation rate), then, the traditional Fisher hypothesis 
obtains: dRJdT  = dR*ld.rr* = 1.’’ Thus in our work below we will consider 
two cases. In the “closed economy case,” the tax-adjusted Fisher effect holds. 
In the “open economy case,” the traditional Fisher effect holds. 
Equity Financing 
An analogous distinction between open and closed economy effects holds 
in the case of equity financing; we focus again initially on the closed economy 
case. The firm’s real cost of equity finance, pe, is defined as 
(4)  p,  =  D+  E-  IT, 
where D is the dividend per dollar invested and E is the ex-dividend nominal 
return per dollar invested. In contrast to interest payments, dividends and re- 
tained earnings are not deductible for corporations. In what follows, we adopt 
the tax capitalization view of  equity taxation (see Auerbach 1979; Bradford 
9. Desai and Hines (chap. 6 in this volume) discuss complications arising from differences in 
the taxation of interest income and foreign exchange gains and losses and illustrate the effects of 
changes in inflation on international capital flows. 
10. In most OECD countries, tax authorities treat gains and losses on foreign currency for tax 
purposes as interest receipts or interest payments (see, e.g., Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development 1992). 
11. Levi (1977) and Hansson and Stuart (1986) discuss complications arising when interest 
income and foreign exchange capital gains and losses are taxed at different rates. 
Both equalities implicitly assume that domestic and foreign inflation rates move independently. 
More generally, one could model the expected exchange rate change making assumptions about 
the relative importance of traded and nontraded goods. Such a modification would produce a dif- 
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1981; King 1977), which suggests that the relevant equity tax rate is the effec- 
tive capital gains tax rate, regardless of dividend policy.l*  This view is prem- 
ised on the assumptions that equity funds come primarily from retained earn- 
ings (i.e., lower dividends paid out of current earnings) rather than from new 
share  issues  and  that  earnings distributions to  shareholders are primarily 
through dividends rather than share repurchases. The idea is that taxes on divi- 
dend distributions are capitalized into the value of the equity rather than impos- 
ing a burden on the returns to new investment, as would be the case if new 
investment were financed by the issue of new shares. 
Under the tax capitalization view,  marginal equity funds for a dividend- 
paying firm come through retained earnings. Hence, the opportunity cost to the 
shareholder of  a dollar of  new investment is reduced by  the dividend taxes 
forgone (evaluated at the dividend tax rate T~),  net of the increased tax burden 
on the capital gains induced by the accrual (evaluated at the accrual-equivalent 
tax rate on capital gains, c).  Because the value of new  investment per dollar 
invested, q, equals its cost to the shareholder, the equilibrium cost of retaining 
a dollar is q = 1 -  T~ + cq, which implies that q = (1 -  TJ(~  -  c). 
Capital market equilibrium requires additionally that the after-tax rate of 
return on the firm’s investment in (nominal terms) equals the investor’s required 
rate of return, pi. Following Auerbach (1983), for a given value of q: 
”p,  = (1 - Td)D/q  + (1 +  c)E 
Substituting for q and converting to real terms: 
(5b)  pi  =  pi - T = (1 - c)(D  +  E) - ?r. 
Combining terms in equation (4) and (5b), we can express the firm’s real cost 
of equity financing as 
(6) 
where i refers to the marginal investor. 
Further, in equilibrium, investors’ after-tax real returns on debt and equity, 
adjusted for a risk premium, X,  must be equal; that is, r = pi -  X.  Solving for 
pi and substituting the resulting expression into equation (6), using equation 
(11, we get 
(7)  p,  =  X/(1 - c) + [(l - Tp)/(l - c)]R - T. 
Differentiation of  this expression, assuming that the risk premium is unaf- 
fected by inflation and deferring consideration of open economy effects to be- 
low, we find that for a given r (i.e., in the tax-adjusted Fisher effect case), lower 
12. Recent evidence in support of  the tax capitalization view is presented in Auerbach and 
Hassett (1997) and Harris, Hubbard, and Kemsley (1997). For a more general discussion of alter- 
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inflation unambiguously reduces the cost of equity finance by the factor c/(  1 - 
c).  This term captures the “inflation tax” paid by  shareholders who  receive 
purely nominal gains; taxation of real capital gains would eliminate this effect. 
There is another, offsetting effect, however, if  the traditional Fisher effect 
holds (in which the nominal bond rate rises point for point with inflation). In 
this case, lower inflation also raises I  by  T~  times the change in inflation and, 
hence, pi by the same amount. As a result, the total impact on the firm’s real 
cost of  equity financing in this case depends on the difference between the 
personal tax rate on interest and the effective capital gains tax rate. 
Turning to equity-financing issues that arise in an open economy setting, the 
degree of  U.S. market power and complexity of the international taxation of 
equity returns are once again central to the analysis. If the United States is very 
large relative to the rest of the world, then the analysis essentially reduces to 
the closed economy case. However, to the extent that the United States is a 
price taker, the details of international taxation of equity returns become im- 
portant. In this case, the residence-based taxation discussed above in the case 
of debt finance no longer applies. Instead, source-based taxation is more appli- 
cable. In its pure form, source-based country taxation implies that income orig- 
inating in country A is taxed uniformly, regardless of the residency of the recip- 
ient of the income; in addition, residents of country A are not taxed by country 
A on the residents’ foreign-source income. For either a risk-neutral U.S. inves- 
tor or a foreign investor, the same parity relationship holds (assuming no ex- 
pected change in the exchange rate). In this case, a viable equilibrium exists in 
which the U.S. equity rate of return is related to the corresponding exogenous 
foreign equity rate of return as well as to the domestic and foreign tax rates. 
In practice, however, tax law is much more complicated; to simplify, it is 
roughly the case that the United States taxes the foreign-source equity income 
of its residents but allows a tax credit against the taxes paid to foreign govern- 
ments. The credit is limited to the product of the U.S. tax rate and the amount 
of foreign-source income (with carryforward and carrybackward provisions for 
excess credits). Thus U.S. residents generally end up paying taxes on their 
foreign-source income at the higher of  the foreign and U.S. tax rate but pay 
at the U.S. rate on their U.S.-source income. A special provision applies to 
multinational firms. Foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parents are allowed to defer 
U.S. taxes on foreign earnings until they are repatriated, at which time taxes 
paid to foreign governments are credited against the U.S. tax liability (see 
Hines and Hubbard 1995); deferral makes sense in periods in which foreign 
tax rates are lower than U.S. tax rates (see, e.g., Hines and Hubbard  1990; 
Altshuler, Newlon, and Randolph 1995). 
Assuming symmetrical treatment by foreign governments of their residents’ 
foreign-source income, the parity conditions now  depend on the difference 
between tax rates; if the U.S. rate is smaller than the foreign rate (i.e., if T* > 
T)  the parity relationship facing a U.S. investor compares the real after-U.S.- 
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foreign equity investment; however, the relationship facing a foreign investor 
is given by  a comparison of  the real after-foreign-tax return on a U.S. equity 
investment and the real after-foreign-tax return on a foreign equity invest- 
ment.I3  An equilibrium exists in the case of tax harmonization (i.e., identical 
tax rates, credits, etc.). In this case, the arbitrage conditions suggest equality 
between pretax equity rates of return. For the firm in a small open economy 
the world pretax rate of financing p,*  is taken as given. Thus, for the firm using 
both debt and equity financing, p,*  = R*(l -  T~)  -  IT, which holds only by 
accident given the absence of  any equilibrating mechanism. (In general, do- 
mestic and international capital market equilibrium will hold simultaneously 
only if the risk premium and capital structure adjust.) For simplicity, we focus 
only on the all-debt or all-equity firm in the open economy examples below. 
Cost of  Funds 
cost of equity and the cost of debt: 
The total real cost of investment funds equals the weighted average of the 
(8)  P  =  wdpd  +  wePe> 
where wd and we  are, respectively, the shares of debt and equity in total finance. 
For the closed economy simulations presented below, these weights will be 
treated  as  empirical constants, although in  general they  would  vary  with 
changes in tax law and inflation. For our open economy simulations, we do not 
explicitly impose assumptions about the weights. Rather than make arbitrary 
assumptions about the effect of inflation on the equilibrium risk premiums and 
capital structure, we provide the estimates for the all-debt and all-equity cases. 
Of course, it is relatively easy to consider intermediate cases once one knows 
the values at the comers, and we do not mean to imply that all foreign compa- 
nies are at financing corners. Rather, it is likely the case that the risk premium 
increases with indebtedness, and this serves as an equilibrating factor in ex- 
plaining the observed behavior of firms in open economies. 
5.2.2  Corporate After-Tax Cash Flow 
We  assume that managers of corporations make production and input deci- 
sions in a manner that maximizes the wealth of  shareholders. In particular, 
firms acquire new capital so as to maximize the present discounted value of 
the generated after-corporate-tax cash flow. Before-tax cash flow is equal to 
revenues (net of  optimal variable input costs) less the total cost of  the new 
capital goods; in addition, taxes are paid at rate T,  on revenues, with deductions 
allowed for depreciation and interest paid on corporate debt. Each of the terms 
making up after-tax cash flow requires some explanation. 
The expected before-tax revenue stream generated by  an investment is not 
13. Cumins  and Hubbard (1995) describe the effect of international tax rules and parent com- 
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constant over time. It declines because the economic service flow of the capital 
good is assumed to decay exponentially at rate 6 (where this decay rate does 
not vary with time but does vary with the durability of the capital good) and 
rises because the general level of prices is assumed to increase exponentially 
at rate r.  Moreover, the choice of  asset durability-short  lived versus long 
lived-is  endogenous, a point to which we will return below. The total cost of 
new capital goods includes the purchase price, as well as installation or adjust- 
ment costs that possibly rise at an increasing rate with the quantity of invest- 
ment. The cash outlays associated with financing, either through corporate debt 
obligations or payments to equity holders, are not included as part of cash flow; 
rather these financing costs are included as part of  the firm's  discount rate, 
discussed above. 
Taxes also are part of cash flow. In the United States, the tax treatment of 
capital investments has changed substantially over time (see the description in 
Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard 1994). The last major change occurred with 
the Tax Reform Act of  1986, which eliminated the investment tax credit and 
reduced the top federal statutory corporate income tax rate from 46 to 34 per- 
cent (which was increased to 35 percent in  1993). In  addition, depreciation 
allowances were changed significantly. 
Currently, only the historical or original cost of a capital asset, HC, may be 
written off even if the cost of replacing the asset is rising over time, and this is 
the most important channel through which inflation interacts with the tax code 
to lower investment. Further, assets are depreciated over a fixed period of 
time-the  service life, T-depending  on the type of  asset. Most .machinery 
and equipment, so-called personal property, has a service life of seven years, 
although computers and light vehicles have five-year service lives and small 
tools three-year service lives. Commercial real property can be written off over 
39 years. The dollar amount that can be written off in any year also depends 
on the type of  asset. Personal property is allowed to be depreciated at a rate 
greater than that using the method of straight-line depreciation (= HC/T per 
year), and in this sense the depreciation on personal property is said to be 
accelerated. More precisely, personal property can employ the 200 percent (or 
double declining balance) method with a half-year convention in the first year 
and switch to straight line when optimal. We explain this method of acceler- 
ated depreciation in detail in the appendix. Put simply, the dollar magnitude of 
depreciation allowed is equivalent to that of  straight-line depreciation in the 
first year that  depreciation is taken  (because of  the half-year  convention), 
greater than straight-line depreciation for the next few years, and less than 
straight-line depreciation for the final few years.I4  Nevertheless, with a positive 
14. The part of the accelerated depreciation scheme that allows a switch to straight-line depreci- 
ation when such a switch is optimal means that the undepreciated balance remaining at the time 
of  the switch is written off in equal increments over the remaining service life; it does not imply 
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discount rate, the present value of depreciation allowances using this method 
of accelerated depreciation exceeds that using straight line. In contrast to the 
tax treatment of personal property, real property must be written off using the 
straight-line method under current law. The present value of depreciation al- 
lowances per dollar invested will be denoted by z. 
5.2.3  Taxes and the User Cost of Capital 
The nominal marginal cost of funds, p + rr, where p is given above as the 
total real cost of investment funds, is the discount rate that the firm applies 
to each component of its after-corporate-tax cash flows related to investment. 
Maximization of the present discounted value of these cash flows over an infi- 
nite horizon, under the assumptions of no adjustment or installation costs for 
new capital and no change in the relative price of capital goods, q, implies that 
the pretax marginal product of capital today equals today’s user cost of capital, 
C,,  where 
(9)  c,  =  qt(p  +  8)(1 - T,Z)/(1 - Tc). 
This is the familiar formula derived by Hall and Jorgenson (1967), which itself 
draws on the seminal work of Jorgenson(  1963)F  If the instantaneous expected 
rate of change of the relative price of new capital goods, Q/q, is not zero, the 
user cost becomes 
Introduction of corporate taxes affects the user cost of capital in three ways. 
First, in the absence of tax deductions for depreciation and interest costs, an 
increase in the corporate income tax rate, T,, increases the before-tax marginal 
15. Switching for a moment to discrete time and assuming no corporate taxes (7,  = 0) or change 
in the price of  output  (TI  = 0), the economic logic underlying the user cost concept becomes 
readily apparent for the firm that finds it desirable to buy a new capital good at the beginning of 
period t at price ql; and sell it at the beginning of the next period at a different price 42,;  there are 
no costs of installing the new capital and no transactions costs in its purchase or sale. Assume that 
the resulting increment to production, MPK, takes place at the beginning of period  t,  is stored 
costlessly during the period, and is sold at the beginning of period t + 1 for (pMPK),,,,  wherep 
denotes the constant price of output. Also assume that like production, depreciation of the capital 
takes place at the beginning of the period and assume that the firm spends 6q:  at the beginning of 
the period to replace the worn-out 6 units of  capital. If p is the required rate of return for investors, 
then the present value of the net cash flow is given by  -4:  -  6q,* + [(pMPK),,, + q,*,,]/(I  + p). 
which equals zero for a marginal investment. Rearranging this expression yields (pMPK),,,  = 
q:  [p + 6 + p6 -  (Aq,*,,  / @)I,  where Aql;+,  / q,* denotes the capital gain or loss on the asset due 
to a change in its market price; in our simple example, the capital gain or loss is realized, but in 
general it may be accrued rather than realized. The expression arising in the one-period problem 
approximates the continuous-time version of the user cost (with no corporate taxes or change in 
output prices); indeed, the interaction term, p6, vanishes in continuous time. 
Put another way, with no corporate taxes the firm’s cost of capital in use has three components: 
the first is the combined real cost of debt and equity financing, pq,,  which incorporates the required 
real rate of return of bondholders and shareholders, each on an after-personal-tax basis; the second 
is the economic rate of decay of capital with an unchanging relative price of new capital 6q,;  and 
the third is an offset due to an instantaneous real capital gain on the capital, (cj/q)  4,. 210  Darrel Cohen, Kevin A. Hassett, and R. Glenn Hubbard 
product of capital necessary to yield an acceptable after-tax rate of  return to 
investors, thereby increasing the user cost. Second, a higher corporate income 
tax rate increases the value of depreciation deductions and hence reduces the 
user cost. The multiplicative factor, (1 -  ~,z)/(l  -  TJ, in equation (10) cap- 
tures the combination of  these two effects; on balance, the user cost is in- 
creased under current U.S.  tax  law  because expensing-or  the immediate 
write-off-of  plant and equipment expenditures is not permitted (i.e., z < 1). 
Third, a higher corporate tax rate increases the value of interest deductions and 
hence, all else being equal, reduces the real cost of debt financing, pd. Given 
realistic parameter values, however, the first effect dominates: on balance, cor- 
porate taxes increase the user cost or the minimum pretax marginal product of 
capital necessary to yield an acceptable real rate of return to investors.16  As a 
consequence, corporate taxes in the United States diminish the incentive to 
invest. 
5.2.4  Inflation, Taxes, and the User Cost of Capital 
with No Adjustment Costs 
For given values of  p and 6, the user cost varies directly with the rate of 
price inflation because the present value of depreciation-which  uses the nom- 
inal rate p + IT  for discounting-varies  inversely with inflation as a result of 
historical cost depreciation. Although not examined here, other treatments of 
this issue, such as the comparative study edited by King and Fullerton (1984), 
emphasize that inflation increases the “effective tax rate” on capital (the pretax 
real rate of return on a marginal investment project, net of depreciation less the 
posttax real rate of return to savers, as a fraction of the former). Thus, for given 
values of p and 6,  a reduction in the general rate of inflation creates an incen- 
tive on the margin for a higher level of capital accumulation. 
In addition, the sensitivity of the user cost to expected inflation depends on 
the amount by  which the total real corporate cost of  funds, p,  responds to 
changes in the inflation rate. As we noted above, the real cost of debt financing, 
pd, is subject to offsetting influences in the closed economy case. On the one 
hand, the tax deductibility of nominal interest payments, for a given required 
real after-tax return, r, by corporate debt holders, implies that a reduction in 
the general rate of inflation increases the cost of debt financing in proportion 
16. To  obtain a sense of the magnitudes involved for the first effect, suppose that new capital 
received no depreciation allowances (z = 0) and that the corporate income tax rate were 0.5; in 
this case, the pretax  marginal product of capital would have to double in value relative to the 
no-tax case. Under current law, the federal corporate income tax rate is 0.35, while depreciation 
allowances for equipment  investment imply that z is roughly 0.75 (with an  inflation rate of  3 
percent per year); together these imply that corporate taxes raise the minimum pretax marginal 
product of equipment capital by about 15 percent. For investment in structures, depreciation allow- 
ances imply that z is about 0.40, and corporate taxation raises the minimum pretax marginal prod- 
uct of structures by about 30 percent. The final effect of corporate taxation is to reduce the real 
cost of debt financing, pa; given reasonable parameter values and an assumed constancy of the 
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to the marginal corporate income tax rate. On  the other hand, bondholders 
must pay taxes on their nominal interest income at the marginal personal tax 
rate on interest income, implying that lower inflation reduces the cost of debt 
financing. On balance, the effect of  inflation on the cost of debt financing is 
proportional to the difference between the marginal personal and corporate 
income tax rates, T~ -  T,,  and the effect vanishes if the tax rates are equal. In 
our open economy case, however, only the former effect holds, and thus lower 
inflation raises the cost of debt financing. In the closed economy, a lower infla- 
tion rate unambiguously reduces the real cost of  equity financing, pe, for a 
given required real after-tax rate of  return by bondholders and, hence, share- 
holders (i.e., if the tax-adjusted Fisher effect holds) because of the taxation of 
nominal capital gains on corporate assets. By contrast, in a small open econ- 
omy, the real cost of equity financing will not depend on inflation. 
5.2.5  Inflation, the User Cost, and the Durability of Capital 
The sensitivity of  the user cost of  capital to inflation also varies with the 
durability of capital. In the special case in which the rate at which historical 
costs can be written off for tax purposes equals the rate of economic deprecia- 
tion (assumed above to be constant over time for a given type of  capital)- 
approximately a declining-balance method in discrete time-Auerbach  (198 1) 
establishes the result that the inflation sensitivity of the user cost declines with 
asset durability, for a given p;”  this implies that inflation weighs more heavily 
on short-lived than long-lived assets, an  effect that is confirmed by our simula- 
tions for personal property reported below (which also allow for p to change 
with inflation). As a result, lower inflation promotes a substitution of  short- 
lived for long-lived assets, with a consequent increase in an aggregate 6;  while 
we  do not allow for this effect in our simulations, its inclusion would only 
diminish the sensitivity of the user cost to inflation for personal property such 
as equipment. However, for different types of  real property, we find that the 
inflation sensitivity of the user cost is virtually independent of asset durability; 
indeed, one can show analytically that the general relationship between the two 
is no longer unambiguously negative with straight-line depreciation allow- 
ances. In section 5.6 we attempt to quantify the interasset distortions arising 
from inflation. 
5.2.6  Inflation, Taxes, and the User Cost of Capital with Adjustment Costs 
While our analysis to this point captures effects of  current changes in the 
tax code and inflation on current incentives to invest, it omits other relevant 
features that might allow current incentives to depend on future changes in the 
tax code and inflation. For example, our assumption of  no adjustment costs 
17. Auerbach actually demonstrates the equivalent proposition that the inflation sensitivity of 
the required internal rate of return before taxes, v = (dq)  -  8, declines with asset durability; he 
also shows that the inflation sensitivity of the effective corporate tax rate, (u -  p)/v, declines with 
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implies that investment decisions made today can be implemented immediately 
and in no way  depend on either expected future financial or tax conditions. 
The potentially large instantaneous increment to a firm’s capital stock implied 
by this view has long been recognized to contrast with an empirical investment 
process at the firm level that appears to be much smoother. This suggests that 
firms cannot adjust their capital stocks quickly without incurring substantial 
adjustment costs. If these costs rise nonlinearly with the level of capital expen- 
ditures and, perhaps, are themselves of an investment nature-such  as work- 
force training-then  firms find it desirable to spread capital expenditures over 
time in a manner that depends on expected future financial and tax conditions. 
Jorgenson and various collaborators in the development of the neoclassical 
model derive an expression for the desired and actual capital stock as a func- 
tion of the user cost of capital and net revenue. The gap between the desired 
and actual capital stock was closed by an ad hoc mechanism (such as delivery 
lags). A more contemporary application is offered by Auerbach (1989b). Auer- 
bach begins with the Euler equation for investment and assumes a production 
function, productivity shocks, and convex adjustment costs. He approximates 
the optimal solution for perturbations by  solving a linearized version of  the 
Euler equation. 
The above discussion assumes a one-time permanent change in the rate of 
inflation. One might also be interested in the effects of a gradual reduction in 
inflation. For this purpose, we can use Auerbach’s result that the optimal level 
of investment at date t varies inversely with the weighted average of the current 
and all expected future user costs of capital 
where the weights, wi,  sum to unity; because the weights decline exponentially, 
expected changes in the distant future will have relatively small effects on the 
current value of the user cost. In contrast to the conventional (Hall-Jorgenson) 
user cost formulation, the user cost also incorporates expected changes in tax 
parameters. Specifically, the user cost of capital at date s is 
In this expression, r denotes the present value of the tax savings from deprecia- 
tion allowances per dollar of investment, D;  that is, 
note that depreciation allowances are discounted at the default risk-free nomi- 
nal interest rate, i, in recognition of  the fact that historically in the postwar 
United States legislated changes in depreciation schedules have never been 
applied to capital already in place nor has the corporate income tax rate varied 
substantially (with the exception of the changes legislated in the Tax Reform 
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formulation only if today’s rate of general price inflation, the relative price of 
capital goods, and the tax code are expected to remain unchanged into the 
indefinite future (in which case 
Such conditions are unlikely to hold in practice, of course. Indeed, we are 
particularly interested in the effects on current investment incentives of a future 
reduction in the inflation rate, anticipated, perhaps, as a result of  a credible 
long-term policy goal by the Federal Reserve to achieve a stable price level. We 
expand on the analysis presented earlier of the effect of a decline in inflation on 
investment using the forward-looking formulation of the user cost of capital in 
section 5.4. Intuitively, if expectations of lower inflation in the future reduce 
future user costs and hence increase firms’ long-run desired capital stock, then, 
in order to minimize adjustment costs, firms begin to increase investment in 
the current period. 
does not change over time). 
5.3  Estimating Effects of Inflation on the User Cost of Capital 
In this section, we present empirical estimates of the effects of the rate of 
inflation on the user cost of capital under current U.S. tax law. For purposes of 
this exercise, we assume that firms take inflation as given; in particular, infla- 
tion is not affected by the investment policies of firms. In addition, inflation is 
assumed not to affect the rate of economic depreciation, 6, and tax parameters 
such as the corporate income tax rate and nominal depreciation allowances 
per dollar invested. In one set of  simulations, inflation also does not affect 
bondholders’ required real after-tax rate of return, r, and local taxes affect the 
cost of equity as well. In another set, inflation does not affect the real before- 
tax rate of interest, R -  T,  or real before-tax cost of equity. Finally, our results 
are partial equilibrium estimates of the effect of inflation on the user cost of 
capital; none of  our results in this section allow for the general equilibrium 
effects of inflation on capital formation and, hence, on the real before-tax rate 
of return. 
Table 5.1 presents the user cost of three types of equipment at various infla- 
tion rates, in the closed economy case, assuming that 30 percent of inventories 
Table 5.1  User Cost, Equipment Investment: Closed Economy Case, q = .3 
Inflation Rate  7-Year Life  5-Year Life  3-Year Life 
0  0.209  0.266  0.401 
0.02  0.218  0.276  0.412 
0.04  0.227  0.286  0.422 
0.06  0.235  0.295  0.432 
0.08  0.244  0.303  0.442 
0.10  0.251  0.3  11  0.45 1 
0.12  0.259  0.320  0.461 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note:  q  represents the fraction of inventories subject to FIFO accounting. 214  Darrel Cohen, Kevin A. Hassett, and R. Glenn Hubbard 
Table 5.2  User Cost, Equipment Investment: Closed Economy Case, q = 0 








0.209  0.266  0.401 
0.218  0.276  0.412 
0.227  0.285  0.422 
0.235  0.294  0.432 
0.243  0.302  0.441 
0.251  0.311  0.450 
0.258  0.318  0.459 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: q  represents the fraction of inventories subject to FIFO accounting. 
are subject to FIFO accounting;18  table 5.2 assumes that no firms use FIFO 
accounting. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present the same calculations for the open econ- 
omy case. Tables 5.5  through 5.8 present summary results for two types of 
structures. The first column of each table gives the rate of price inflation, which 
varies from 0 to 12 percent per annum. The remaining columns show the user 
cost of capital for a one-dollar investment. The “debt financing” columns as- 
sume that r is 2 percent per year, pi is 6 percent per year, T, is 0.35, T~ is 0.45, 
and c is  O.lO.I9 
The results in tables 5.1 and 5.2 show that for each of  the three types of 
personal property, the marginal effect of inflation on the user cost of capital is 
approximately independent of the rate of inflation when the economy is closed. 
Of  course, this conclusion reflects variation in modest rates of  inflation. For 
very high inflation, the cost of  an extra percentage point of inflation may be 
small because the present value of real depreciation deductions is already very 
low. For each type of capital asset, a 1 percentage point decline in the annual 
rate of inflation lowers the user cost by slightly less than 0.5 percentage points, 
no matter which assumption we make about inventory accounting. The relative 
unimportance of the inventory accounting method also holds in the remainder 
of our results and reflects the relatively low levels of  inflation explored here. 
18. In the empirical work below, we assume that output is produced and held as finished goods 
inventories for one year; we allow for inflation’s impact on inventory profits to increase the corpo- 
rate tax rate by ~TT,  where q  is the fraction of  inventories subject to FIFO accounting. This is not 
a fully satisfactory treatment of inventories because it treats them as entirely finished goods rather 
than as raw materials or work in progress. 
19. Results for the closed economy case are sensitive to the choice of T~;  the impact of inflation 
on the user cost of capital is independent of T~ in the open economy case. Our assumed value for 
T~ of 0.45 corresponds to the (combined federal and average state) rate paid by the top-bracket 
investor. If, alternatively, we assume that T~ = 0.21 (based on an update of  the average marginal 
tax rate in F’rakken  et al. 1991). the effects of  inflation on the user cost of capital are somewhat 
smaller than those reported in tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.5, and 5.6. For equipment investment, e.g.,  each 
percentage point decline in inflation reduces the user cost by about 0.25 percentage points when 
T~ = 0.21, as opposed to 0.5 percentage points when T~ = 0.45. 215  Inflation and the User Cost of Capital 
The rough constancy of  the relationship between the user cost and inflation 
implies that a reduction in the rate of inflation from a low initial level has a 
larger positive percentage impact on the user cost than a reduction from a high 
level, for any given durability of capital. Thus, if the elasticity of firm invest- 
ment demand with respect to the user cost is constant, as is the case with a 
Cobb-Douglas production technology, the beneficial impact on the incentive to 
invest of lowering the rate of inflation from its current level of about 3 percent 
per year to zero may be greater than the beneficial effect of lowering it by  3 
percentage points from the higher levels that prevailed in the United States 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 indicate how our results change for a small open econ- 
omy. When the marginal source of financing is new equity issuance, the results 
are comparable to the closed economy case, but when the marginal source of 
financing is debt, the deductibility of interest payments is important enough to 
reverse the results. The results for structures are qualitatively similar to those 
for equipment, although there are quantitative differences. Clearly, the choice 
of marginal financing source is the dominant factor in the open economy case. 
Another interesting finding follows from the fact that the response of  the 
user cost to small changes in inflation is not constant across either types of 
capital or levels of inflation.  A large change in the inflation rate, say 10 percent- 
age points, has a differential effect on the user cost depending on the durability 
of capital. In particular, a large increase in the inflation rate raises the user cost 
of assets (or limits the decline in the open economy debt-financing case) with 
a three-year service life more than those with a five-year or a seven-year life, 
but variation across real property assets is essentially nonexistent. These find- 
ings are consistent with the discussion in subsection 5.2.5, in which we argued 
on analytic grounds that the inflation sensitivity of the user cost declines unam- 
biguously with asset durability in the case of assets, such as equipment, that 
can be written off using a declining-balance method of depreciation, but that 
the relationship is ambiguous in the case of assets, such as structures, that are 
subject to the straight-line method. 
5.4  Estimating Effects of a Gradual Reduction 
in Inflation on the User Cost 
In this section, we present estimates of the effects of inflation on the user 
cost of equipment capital (seven-year life) and on the growth rate of the capital 
stock using the formulation we described earlier. The estimates are summa- 
rized in figures 5.1,5.2, and 5.3. The top panel of each figure presents the time 
path of inflation, the middle panel shows the time path of the user cost, and the 
bottom panel shows the growth rate of the capital stock. The key assumptions 
are that the tax-adjusted Fisher effect holds; that the elasticity of investment 
with respect to the user cost is -0.75;  and that the decay rate used to calculate 
the weights, w,  in  CF, which embed adjustment costs, is 0.5, the preferred Table 5.3  User Cost, Equipment Investment: Open Economy Case, q = .3 
Equity Financing  Debt Financing 








0.223  0.281  0.416  0.195  0.252  0.387 
0.229  0.287  0.423  0.190  0.248  0.384 
0.234  0.293  0.430  0.186  0.244  0.380 
0.239  0.298  0.436  0.181  0.240  0.377 
0.244  0.303  0.442  0.175  0.234  0.372 
0.248  0.308  0.448  0.169  0.229  0.368 
0.252  0.313  0.454  0.162  0.223  0.363 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note:  q  represents the fraction of inventories subject to FIFO accounting. Table 5.4  User Cost, Equipment Investment: Open Economy Case, q = 0 
Equity Financing  Debt Financing 
Inflation Rate  7-Year Life  5-Year Life  3-Year Life  7-Year Life  5-Year Life  3-Year Life 
0  0.223  0.281  0.416  0.195  0.252  0.387 
0.02  0.229  0.287  0.423  0.191  0.248  0.384 
0.04  0.234  0.292  0.429  0.186  0.244  0.381 
0.06  0.238  0.297  0.435  0.181  0.240  0.377 
0.08  0.242  0.302  0.440  0.176  0.235  0.373 
0.10  0.246  0.306  0.446  0.170  0.230  0.369 
0.12  0.249  0.310  0.45 1  0.164  0.225  0.364 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: q represents the fraction of inventories subject to FIFO accounting. 218  Dam1 Cohen, Kevin A. Hassett, and R. Glenn Hubbard 
Table 5.5  User Cost, Structures Investment: Closed Economy Case, q = .3 








0.091  0.102 
0.100  0.111 
0.107  0.119 
0.114  0.127 
0.119  0.133 
0.125  0.139 
0.130  0.144 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: q  represents the fraction of inventories subject to FIFO accounting. 
Table 5.6  User Cost, Structures Investment: Closed Economy Case, q = 0 








0.091  0.102 
0.100  0.111 
0.107  0.119 
0.113  0.127 
0.119  0.133 
0.125  0.139 
0.130  0.144 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: -q represents the fraction of inventories subject to FIFO accounting. 
Table 5.7  ,  User Cost, Structures Investment: Open Economy Case, q = .3 
Equity Financing  Debt Financing 








0.115  0.124  0.082  0.092 
0.118  0.130  0.076  0.087 
0.121  0.134  0.068  0.079 
0.124  0.138  0.059  0.071 
0.125  0.142  0.050  0.061 
0.127  0.145  0.040  0.050 
0.128  0.148  0.030  0.038 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: -q represents the fraction of inventories subject to FIFO accounting. 
estimate in Auerbach and Hassett (1991). The figures indicate that changes in 
inflation can generate large effects on capital stock growth. 
Figure 5.1 simulates a likely path investment might take if a credible com- 
mitment were announced to gradually move toward price stability. The simula- 
tion indicates that a fully anticipated decline in the inflation rate from 4 percent 
in year  t to zero four years later (in equal increments) begins to affect the Table 5.8  User Cost, Structures Investment: Open Economy Case, q = 0 
Inflation 
/111111/I,II, 
Equity Financing  Debt Financing 













0.115  0.124  0.082  0.092 
0.118  0.130  0.076  0.087 
0.121  0.134  0.068  0.079 
0.122  0.138  0.060  0.07  1 
0.124  0.142  0.05 1  0.061 
0.125  0.145  0.042  0.050 















Fig. 5.1  Effects of anticipated decline in inflation on user cost and capital stock 
(seven-year life; tax-adjusted Fisher effect) 220  Darrel Cohen, Kevin A. Hassett, and R. Glenn Hubbard 
user cost before the inflation rate actually declines because of the changes to 
investors' expectations when the commitment is announced. Indeed, the user 
cost has completed about 40 percent of its total adjustment by time t;  the full 
adjustment-which  from table 5.1 is 180 basis points-is  completed exactly 
four years after time t.  The capital stock growth rate also increases in advance 
of the completed disinflation, rising nearly 0.5 percentage points by time t;  the 
growth rate increases by  nearly  1.5 percentage points when inflation equals 
zero and subsequently begins its decline back to the initial steady state value. 
If  the shock occurs while the capital stock is growing at about its historical 
trend rate, then this reduction in inflation will increase capital stock growth 
over the period by roughly 50 percent. 
Figure 5.2 shows the effects of  an even larger anticipated decline in the 
inflation rate from  12 percent per year, the level that obtained in the early 
1980s, to 4 percent over an eight-year period. Again, a sizable part of the com- 
plete adjustment in the user cost and in the growth rate of  the capital stock 
occurs by time t. Further, by the time inflation reaches 4 percent, the capital 
stock growth rate over the period has more than doubled from its initial steady 
state level. In figure 5.3, we consider a slightly different experiment. In this 
case, we consider the impact on the user cost of an unanticipated increase in 
the inflation rate of  1 percentage point (from a 4 percent level) that occurs at 
time t. After time t, we  simulate the subsequent response of  the level of in- 
flation to the shock reflecting the estimated time-series properties of the Liv- 
ingston expected inflation series mentioned above. These suggest that a 1 per- 
centage point current shock to inflation would ultimately increase the level 
of inflation by  1.5 percentage points. The latter effect magnifies the increase 
in the user'cost that would otherwise occur by  about 20 basis points (or 50 
percent). 
5.5  Effects of Lower Inflation on Consumption 
Auerbach and Hassett (1991) and Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994, 
1995, 1996) demonstrate that estimates of the effect of the user cost of capital 
(or tax-adjusted Q)  on investment during major tax reforms are more likely to 
reflect the true underlying effect than conventional panel data estimates.20  They 
estimate the elasticity of the equipment investment rate with respect to its user 
cost in the United States to be about -0.75  and the corresponding elasticity 
for structures at about -0.5.  If the annual inflation rate were reduced from 4 
20. They argue that major tax reforms offer periods in which there is substantial exogenous 
cross-sectional variation in the change in the user cost of capital or tax-adjusted Q. During reform 
periods, an unusually large portion of the variation in the user cost or tax-adjusted Q is observable, 
and the signal-to-noise ratio may be much higher. Using firm-level data, an estimate using tax 
reforms to isolate observable variation in the user cost or Q may significantly decrease the bias in 
the estimate of the effect on investment of the user cost or Q. Cummins et al. (1996) show that 
this is the case for the United States and 11 other OECD countries. 221  Inflation and the User Cost of Capital 
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Fig. 5.2  Effects of anticipated decline in inflation on user cost and capital stock 
(seven-year life; tax-adjusted Fisher effect) 
percent to zero, the user cost of  equipment capital, as shown above, would 
decline by about 2 percentage points, proportionally about 8 percent when the 
tax-adjusted Fisher effect holds. Such a permanent decline in inflation would 
increase the equipment investment rate by  about 6 percent; a similar calcula- 
tion implies that the nonresidential structures investment rate would increase 
7.5 percent. This implies that total business fixed investment rises about 6.5 
percent and the ratio of business fixed investment to private GDP rises about 
5.5 percent. 
In principle, one can calculate the long-run gains in sustainable per capita 
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Fig. 5.3  Effects of unanticipated increase in inflation on user cost and capital 
stock (seven-year life; tax-adjusted Fisher effect) 
inflation.21  In the steady state, investment is proportional to the capital stock, 
and hence, the investment-output and capital-output ratios are proportional. 
Thus, eventually, the 5.5 percent increase in the investment-output  ratio boosts 
the capital-output ratio by the same percentage amount. This implies that even- 
tually output per worker rises 2.2 percent, assuming a Cobb-Douglas produc- 
tion technology with capital's share equal to 0.3 and, hence, an elasticity of 
output per worker with respect to the capital-output ratio equal to 0.4. Thus 
21. This calculation assumes, of course, that the supply of funds to the US.  business sector is 
highly elastic. This high elasticity does not require high interest elasticity of private saving per se; 
funds could flow to the business sector from previously tax-favored domestic sectors (e.g.,  hous- 
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investment per worker (equal to output per worker times the investment-output 
ratio) rises 7.7 percent. It follows that private consumption per worker, whose 
increase equals the weighted percentage growth of output per worker less the 
weighted percentage growth of investment per worker, eventually rises 1.3 per- 
cent permanently. 
Our estimate of the effect of inflation-induced changes in the user cost of 
capital on investment is determined in a partial equilibrium setting. This is 
because we implicitly assume that the supply of funds to the domestic business 
sector is perfectly elastic. To  the extent that household saving and portfolio 
decisions (e.g., housing capital vs. business fixed capital) are insensitive to 
changes in net returns, the increase in investment and the capital stock in re- 
sponse to reductions in the user cost of capital will be attenuated. 
5.6  Inflation, Differential Taxation, and Capital Allocation 
In addition to its effect on the overall level of capital formation, inflation 
can affect the allocation of capital, leading to distortions in the composition of 
the nation’s capital stock. Such distortions are likely to be large when effective 
tax rates on capital income vary widely across assets and sectors (as, e.g., in 
response to the Economic Recovery Tax  Act of  1981 in the United States). 
Measuring the deadweight loss from nonneutral capital taxation requires a 
model with explicit decisions about saving, capital accumulation, production, 
and allocation of consumption. In our analysis of the intratemporal efficiency 
consequences for the allocation of the capital stock of a decline in inflation, 
we employ a simplified version of the model developed by Auerbach (1989a). 
Because other papers in this volume deal with intertemporal distortions in de- 
tail, we chose to simplify Auerbach’s model to the static case. This is especially 
important in our application because critics of low-inflation policies have often 
argued that while low inflation can generate steady state efficiency gains, it 
may exacerbate intratemporal distortions by increasing the importance of dif- 
ferences in depreciation allowances. An  assessment of  the accuracy of this 
claim is an important component of any evaluation of the impact of inflation 
on investment. 
The model contains a three-factor production technology (labor, capital, and 
land) and nine production sectors (agriculture; mining; construction; durable 
goods manufacturing; nondurable goods manufacturing; transportation, com- 
munication, and utilities; wholesale and retail trade; finance, insurance, and 
real estate; and other services). Each industry potentially uses three fixed capi- 
tal goods (equipment, nonresidential structures, and residential structures). 
Solving the model requires a set of assumptions about technology and pref- 
erences. On the technology side, the production function for each sector is of 
the nested constant elasticity of  substitution (CES) form, requiring assump- 
tions about the elasticity of substitution among land and capital goods and the 
elasticity between each of these and labor. On the preferences side, the house- 224  Darrel Cohen, Kevin A. Hassett, and R. Glenn Hubbard 
Table 5.9  Change in Deadweight Loss from Reducing Inflation 
Change in 
Deadweight Loss 
(% of  steady state 
Key Parameters  consumption) 
a=w=e=l  -0.01 
u = w = 1; e = .25  -0.03 
(T = w = 1.e = 2  0 
u  = w = .25;e = 1  0 
cr = 2; w = .25; 
e=l  0.02 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Nore: u  is elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. w is elasticity of substitution among 
capital goods (and land). e is intratemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. 
hold utility function is of the nested CES form, with leisure in the first-period 
nest, requiring assumptions about the intratemporal elasticity of substitution in 
each period, the intertemporal elasticity of  substitution, and the fraction of 
hours worked in the initial equilibrium. For the baseline case, we adopt the set 
of parameters adopted by Auerbach (1989a). 
Table 5.9 contains our estimates of the change in intratemporal distortion 
attributable to a permanent reduction of inflation from 4 percent to zero. We 
assume that the tax on residential structures is zero and the tax on labor is 0.5. 
Prior to the inflation reduction, the effective tax rate on nonresidential struc- 
tures is assumed to be 0.425, and the effective tax rate on equipment is as- 
sumed to be 0.37 (both values taken from Fullerton and Karayannis 1993). 
After the reduction, we estimate that the effective tax rate on structures drops 
to 0.39 while that on equipment drops to 0.31. The table contains our estimates 
of the effect of this drop on the intratemporal distortion. For base-case values 
of the elasticity of substitution  between capital goods, and between capital and 
labor, the change in the distortion is almost zero. The relative insensitivity of 
the intratemporal distortion likely reflects the overwhelming impact of the low 
tax on residential capital. Thus it seems unlikely that sizable intratemporal 
distortions can offset the intertemporal gains estimated by Feldstein (1997). 
While Auerbachs model accounts for the distortion arising from inflation 
nonneutralities in the tax system because of  differences in capital intensity 
across different consumption-goods-producing sectors, for  tradable goods 
such distortions are unimportant because goods prices are set in  an  inter- 
national market. For nontraded goods, however, a reduction in the user cost 
of capital accompanying a decline in inflation reduces the price of relatively 
capital-intensive  goods, so that the Auerbach model applies. Many of the most 
capital-intensive sectors (measured by capital-labor  ratios) identified by Fuller- 
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tation, communications, and utilities). Moreover, efficiency gains from reduc- 
ing capital taxes actually benefit (relatively) low-income households because 
of the capital intensity of the weighted average of goods consumed by those 
households (see Fullerton and Rogers 1997). Thus there may well be distribu- 
tional benefits to lowering inflation as well. This is an important topic for fu- 
ture research. 
5.7  Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
The inflation nonneutralities we have identified in the taxation of household 
and business capital income indicate that given the current tax code, a reduc- 
tion in inflation, all else being equal, would stimulate physical capital accumu- 
lation in the United States (unless the United States is best modeled as a small 
open economy in which a typical firm finances investment exclusively with 
debt). The equilibrium effects on capital formation depend,  in part on the re- 
sponsiveness of saving and portfolio allocation to rates of return, making de- 
sirable more complete analytic integration of saving and portfolio investment 
decisions. While such an endeavor is beyond the scope of  this paper, more 
research along these lines is likely to be fruitful. 
Would additional physical capital accumulation made possible by lower in- 
flation be socially valuable? Available evidence for the United States indicates 
that it would be, at least in the case in which the United States is assumed to 
be a closed economy. Reviewing predictions of several tests of dynamic effi- 
ciency, Hassett and Hubbard ( 1997) conclude that incentives for equipment 
investment have positive social returns. Cohen, Hassett, and Kennedy (1995) 
estimate that fot the United States, golden rule capital stocks for producers’ 
durable equipment significantly exceed their actual levels over the past two 
decades. The welfare analyses in Feldstein (1997) and Abel(l997) also sug- 
gest significant welfare gains from the increased investment in response to a 
lower rate of inflation. 
An alternative means of reaping such a gain would, of course, be to remove 
the inflation nonneutralities from the tax codes by,  say, indexing the tax code. 
As long as the tax code attempts to distinguish between debt and equity, how- 
ever, indexing poses significant practical difficulties (see the discussion in 
Feldstein 1997). Fundamental reform of the income tax or the replacement of 
the income tax with a broad-based consumption tax would be required to elimi- 
nate inflation distortions arising from the taxation of capital income.** 
22. Under the Comprehensive Business Income Tax (see Department of the Treasury 1992) or 
a consumption tax administered as the combination of a wage tax and a business cash-flow tax, 
the user cost of  capital is independent of  inflation as long as real depreciation allowances are 
inflation neutral and the Fisher hypothesis holds approximately; see Hubbard (1997a). 226  Darrel Cohen, Kevin A. Hassett, and R. Glenn Hubbard 
Appendix 
Tax Depreciation Allowances in the United States 
The amount of depreciation allowed for tax purposes on a capital investment 
depends on whether the asset is personal property, such as machines and tools, 
or real property, such as a commercial building, and on the asset's service life 
or cost recovery period, T,  stated in years. Service lives, method of depreciation 
(straight line vs. declining balance), and first-year conventions currently in use 
were established in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
Real Property 
Consider a $1 investment in real nonresidential property (excluding land). 
The service life of  real nonresidential property placed in service after May 
1993 is 39 years. The straight-line method is used; in its simplest form this 
implies that in each of the 39 years, $1/39 can be written off. However, expen- 
diture on real property is subject to a midmonth convention in the first year. 
For example, if the property is initially placed in service any day in January, 
then for tax purposes it is treated as if the starting date were in the middle of 
January, and hence the first-year write-off is only (11.5/12)($1/39).  In general, 
for an initial investment in month m-where  m = 1 corresponds to January, 
m  = 2 to February, and so on-the  first-year write-off is [(12 -  m + 0.5)/ 
12]($1/39). In years 2 through 39, straight-line depreciation is allowed; in year 
40, the remaining undepreciated balance is written off. 
With a nominal discount rate of d percent per year, the present value of 
depreciation allowances for a $1 investment in real property is given by 
T 
z  =  [l/(l +  d)][(12 - m +  0.5)/12](1/T) +  [l/(l +  d)]I(l/T) 
1=2 
+ [l/(l +  d)lT+'(1/T)[1  - ((12 - m  +  0.5)/12)]. 
Personal Property 
There are several cost recovery periods applicable to personal property. The 
three-year class includes small tools; the five-year class includes light motor 
vehicles and computer equipment; the seven-year class includes most machin- 
ery and equipment; the ten-year, fifteen-year, and twenty-year classes include 
a limited number of other assets, such as land improvements. In addition, in- 
vestment in personal property is subject to a midyear convention in the first 
year that depreciation is taken; this convention assumes that the property is 
depreciable for half of the taxable year in which it is placed in service, regard- 
less of the date it actually began to be used. 
Further,  personal  property  can  be  written  off  using  the  200  percent 
declining-balance (or double declining balance) method of accelerated depre- 
ciation. This  method  results in  depreciation that  is  twice  the  straight-line 227  Inflation and the User Cost of Capital 
amount in the first year that depreciation is taken (i.e., it is $2/T for an invest- 
ment of  $1); because of the half-year convention though, depreciation allow- 
ances in the first year are equal to the straight-line amount. In each subsequent 
year the acceleration factor, 2/7’, is applied only to the remaining undepreciated 
balance. In the year  S that  depreciation using the double-declining-balance 
method falls below that allowed under the straight-line method (as applied 
only to the remaining T -  S + 1.5 years), firms are allowed to switch to the 
straight-line method. For example, the optimal year to switch is the fourth year 
for assets in the five-year recovery class and the fifth year for assets in the 
seven-year recovery class. 
With a nominal discount rate of d percent per annum, the present value of 
depreciation allowances for a $1 investment in personal property with service 
life T is given by 
s-1  T  s-l 
z  =  C [l/(l +  d)lkDk  + C [l/(l +  d)lk[l - C Q]/(T - S +  1.5) 
k=l  k=S  ,=I 
+ [l/(l +  d)lT+’(1/2)[1  - 2 Q]/(T - S +  lS),  where 
i=l 
D,  = (1/2)(2/T)  =  1/T, 
D,  = (1 - DI)(2/T), 
D3  = (1 - D, - D2)(2/T),  ..., 
s-2 
Ds-1  = (1 - I: D1)(2/T). 
t=l 
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Comment  Alan J. Auerbach 
This is an interesting paper that focuses on an important distortion deriving 
from the interaction of inflation and the tax system, the impact on business 
fixed investment. It also gives attention to interasset distortions and implicitly 
raises the issue of  the distortion between debt and equity, although not ad- 
dressing this issue directly. 
The authors’ basic conclusion is that a reduction in inflation would lower 
the cost of capital-more  so in a closed than an open economy-and  lead to 
more capital accumulation, which, in the current environment, would increase 
steady state consumption per capita. They find that lowering inflation has a 
very small welfare effect through its impact on interasset distortions. I am in 
basic agreement with these results and so will concentrate on the authors’ inter- 
pretation and on certain questions of methodology. 
Before going into details, it is useful to stand back and evaluate these find- 
ings. First, a higher steady state level of  consumption is not the same as a 
reduction in deadweight loss. To construct a welfare measure, we need to take 
transition generations into account. Indeed, the observed outcome could repre- 
sent a reduction in welfare, depending on the state of  other distortions in a 
second-best situation. 
Second, why  not  calculate  such  a  welfare measure? It  would be  quite 
straightforward to do so, using the same model the paper uses to estimate the 
intratemporal distortions considered in table 5.9. Indeed, this model was origi- 
nally developed precisely for the purpose of measuring the impact of interasset 
and intertemporal distortions simultaneously. Even though the intertemporal 
issue has been considered in other papers, assumptions may differ, leaving us 
comparing interasset apples to intertemporal oranges. Such a comparison in 
the same units might be quite enlightening. For example, in the paper where 
this model was introduced, I found that the reduction in interasset distortions 
due to the Tax  Reform Act of  1986, though  small in absolute terms, had 
roughly same (and offsetting) impact as the rise of several percentage points 
in the effective tax rate on capital income overall that occurred at same time. 
Alan J. Auerbach is the Robert D. Burch hofessor of  Economics and Law and director of  the 
Burch Center for Tax Policy and Public Finance at the University of  California, Berkeley, and a 
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Third, let us consider a fundamental question: why should we  attribute to 
inflation these welfare costs of  a higher tax on capital and greater interasset 
distortions? Perhaps it is plausible for interasset distortions, as it may be tough 
to adjust specific schedules to keep balance at different rates of inflation. But 
if  inflation causes taxes to rise, why is it so hard to reduce tax rates? There 
may be frictions, but the possibility that nominal tax rates can change should 
not be ignored in our discussion. Indeed, changes over time suggest that tax 
policy does respond. The Accelerated Cost Recovery System was introduced 
in 1981, in part to compensate for the erosion of depreciation allowances being 
induced by the high inflation of that period; the depreciation schedules of the 
Tax Reform Act of  1986 were constructed to deliver roughly the same present 
value as indexed economic depreciation allowances would have, given the in- 
flation rate prevailing at the time. 
Now let us turn to the paper’s more specific results, primarily about impact 
of  the tax system on the user cost of capital. To review the theory, inflation 
raises the effective tax rate due to (1) taxation of the inflation component of 
nominal capital gains, (2) taxation of the inflation component of  interest re- 
ceipts, and (3) the use of historic cost depreciation allowances; and it lowers 
the effective tax rate through the deductibility of  the inflation component of 
interest payments. (The paper also considers the impact of  FIFO inventory 
accounting. FIFO accounting certainly raises the cost of holding inventories 
when inflation is present, but it is unclear from the paper how this effect is 
being modeled. In any event, the effect as measured in the tables is very small.) 
Thus a key question is the relative magnitude of tax rates T~ (at which interest 
receipts are taxed) and T, (at which interest receipts are deducted). 
The paper relates the choice of  T~  to the question of whether the economy is 
open or closed. It imposes the standard Fisher equation for the open economy, 
consistent with the assumption that marginal debt holders do not face any U.S. 
tax on interest income. At the other extreme, for the closed economy case, it 
assumes a value of 0.45 for T~ compared to 0.35 for the corporate tax. This is 
a key parameter, and it is not clear where it comes from. My last information 
from TAXSIM (for 1993) had the value T~ = 0.22 for individuals; for tax ex- 
empts, it is zero, and these two groups make up a large share of debt holdings. 
Adding foreigners, also at zero, leaves a lot of high marginal tax payments to 
be made up by  the residual holders of debt, such as insurance companies. It 
seems, then, that the closed economy assumption with respect to T~ is extreme. 
Given that the closed and open economy cases are polar ones, it might have 
been more helpful to present results for a variety of values of  T~,  rather than 
these two cases. 
Before concluding, let me raise one final point. I have trouble with the use 
of all-equity or all-debt extremes for the open economy case. The paper takes 
this route because, it argues, an interior solution to the optimal financial ratio 
is unlikely. But this is true for the closed economy case, too, and simply indi- 
cates that our model of financial policy is too simple. Given that we do observe 232  Darrel Cohen, Kevin A. Hassett, and R. Glenn Hubbard 
debt and equity finance in coexistence, it would be helpful to consider interme- 
diate cases. 
To  conclude, one may ask what else this paper might have considered that 
would influence its results. One thing in particular comes to mind, the presence 
of various limitations on the use of tax losses and tax credits. With an increase 
in inflation, interest expenses increase in real value. On the other hand, infla- 
tion reduces the real value of  depreciation allowances. If  the net impact is to 
increase the real value of deductions, then inflation lessens the probability of 
full deduction and, conversely, a decline in the inflation rate would lead to a 
larger reduction in the cost of capital than the paper estimates. It is not clear 
which way the net effect goes, but it could be important, given that historically 
a large number of firms have not been fully taxable. 
Discussion Summary 
In response to the discussant’s remarks, Glenn Hubbard  said that the paper 
deliberately focuses on the effects of  inflation on steady state consumption 
because welfare calculations would require controversial assumptions about 
transition issues and compensating policies. To study the effect of inflation on 
the allocation of  capital, the authors deliberately did not include other dis- 
torting margins, such as the intertemporal margin, in order not to confound ef- 
fects. 
Hubbard acknowledged that the endogeneity of  political decisions to set 
taxes is potentially important, although, in practice, the Congress does not ap- 
pear to have taken this link into account in its discussion of tax bills. Hubbard 
said that extending the closed economy analysis to the open economy case is 
harder than dealing with debt and equity because in the open economy case a 
greater variety of capital allocations is possible. 
Benjamin Friedman asked for an intuitive explanation of  the authors’ con- 
clusion that the marginal gain to a percentage point reduction in inflation is 
larger at lower levels of inflation. Hubbard responded that the effect of infla- 
tion is approximately linear on the user cost of capital in terms of levels, and 
hence, the relative effect is larger at low levels of inflation. 
Friedman then asked how he  authors’ results compare to the results in Mar- 
tin Feldstein’s paper. Feldstein responded that it is hard to make a comparison 
because his results are expressed as welfare gains whereas the results here are 
in terms of percentage changes in the steady state capital stock. 
Finally, Friedman inquired about the optimal inflation rate implied by the 
paper. Hubbard responded that they are not suggesting an optimal inflation 
rate because the paper does not put forth a specific welfare criterion. However, 
if one simply wanted to maximize steady state capital, a negative inflation rate 
could be optimal. 233  Inflation and the User Cost of Capital 
Edmund Phelps noted that the golden rule capital stock is problematic in an 
open economy and suggested that a way around this problem may be found by 
introducing a variable real exchange rate in the analysis. Othenvise, the capital 
stock adjustment would be very fast. Hubbard agreed that in an open economy 
there is no golden rule capital stock per se and that all capital adjustments take 
place instantaneously. Alan Auerbach suggested that the welfare adjustment 
nevertheless may be slow, but Phelps argued that the welfare adjustment may 
be instantaneous because there must be an optimal capital stock on each day. 
Laurence Meyer remarked that lower inflation works like an investment in- 
centive in the sense that it lowers the real cost of capital. However, it is crucial 
that savings increase to finance the investment. If savings do not increase, the 
interest rate will simply rise, and the capital stock cannot increase. This is why 
the open economy issue is so important-it  implies that there is a very elastic 
savings supply from abroad. 
Martin Feldstein noted that there exists a big puzzle concerning interna- 
tional capital flows. On a daily basis there seem to be huge international capital 
flows, but when the dust settles, the net flows are relatively small. This may 
indicate that the large net capital flows predicted by the open economy model 
may not happen after all. 
Matthew Shapiro inquired about the appropriate average marginal tax rate 
for the calculations, noting that the tax rate of  the marginal holder of  debt 
generally differs from the marginal rate faced by the average holder. Hubbard 
responded that they weighted marginal tax rates faced by  debt holders by the 
taxable interest income of each holder, assuming that all debt holders have the 
same saving elasticity. Martin Feldstein noted that this procedure still may not 
be quite right because some untaxed inframarginal income (e.g., the income 
of  pension funds) should also be part of  the weighting. Another participant 
stressed that it is important to take into account that different people may have 
different saving elasticities. 
Martin Feldstein emphasized the important contribution made by this paper, 
namely, that the “intratemporal dog did not bark.” In other words, the effect of 
inflation on intratemporal asset misallocations is very small compared to the 
intertemporal distortions caused by  inflation. This important conclusion con- 
tradicts the argument that is sometimes made that interasset distortions would 
be made worse at lower inflation, offsetting the intertemporal efficiency gain. 
Hubbard agreed but added the caveat that they assumed that the same debt- 
equity ratio was used to finance different assets. This Page Intentionally Left Blank